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Abstract
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework to analyze the
long-run behavior of an economy characterized by a regime of persis-
tent debt. We introduce a stock-flow consistent dynamic model where
the economic system is represented by a network of trading relation-
ships among agents. Debt contracts are one of such relationships. The
model is characterized by a unique and stable steady-state, which pre-
dicts that (i) aggregate income is always limited from the above by the
money supply and that (ii) debts cause a redistribution of borrowers’
wealth and income in favor of lenders. In the aggregate this may also
lower nominal income, as empirical evidence suggests.
Keywords : Debt, stock-flow consistency, dynamic systems
JEL classification : C61, D31, E21, E51, G01
1 Introduction
After about three decades of “real” economic theorizing, the 2008-2009 crisis
has produced among the economists a renewed interest in the role of debt
and financial variables in general. One important research question refers to
the long-run consequences of a regime of persistent debt (both public and
private).
The existing theoretical literature on debt offers different answers accord-
ing to the perspective assumed. Microeconomic theories generally agree on a
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positive view of debt, which is seen as an extra resource to finance – otherwise
not affordable– productive investments or to implement welfare-enhancing
consumption smoothing. More problematic is the position of macroeco-
nomics: while there is an acknowledgment for the short-run benefits of public
deficits during recessions, in general macro models tend to predict a nega-
tive role for both public and private debts because of their alleged capacity
to introduce microeconomic distortions or to destabilize the regular course
of business. Without any pretension of completeness we only recall some
seminal works. Modigliani (1961) and Diamond (1965) are classical stud-
ies relating public debt to a lower pace of capital accumulation because of
crowding-out effects and raising taxes. Neoclassical debt-augmented growth
models also predict a negative long-run impact of public debt. On the side of
private debts, macroeconomists generally focus on the reinforcing feedbacks
between real and financial variables produced by firms’ balance sheet condi-
tions (leverage). Fisher’s Debt-Deflation theory (1933) probably represents
the first detailed analysis of the issue, and moreover served as an inspira-
tion to the Financial Instability Hypothesis by Minsky (1982) and to the
Financial Accelerator mechanism by Bernanke and Gertler (1989). Both of
these theories, the former by stressing the role of expectations and the latter
the role of asymmetric information, show how corporate debts can amplify
the movements of real sectors and prompt recessions. Along the same lines
are Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Another
strand of contributions focuses on the adverse impact of external debts in
developing Countries, such as Krugman (1988). These results find some con-
firmation from the empirical literature, as for instance in Checherita and
Rother (2010) and Cecchetti et al. (2011), which find a negative relation-
ship between growth and high levels of both public and private debt. Even
stronger is the empirical evidence confirming the detrimental effects of ex-
ternal debts on developing Countries’ growth, as found among the others by
Pattillo et al. (2002) and by Clements et al. (2003).
However, the above models specialize each one on a particular kind of
debt and rely upon very different hypotheses: basically, we believe that a
general model of the pure functioning of debt and its consequences is still to
develop. Thus, our aim is to build a theory of debt that could describe its
effects on the economy in isolation, without resorting to auxiliary hypotheses
such as capital accumulation, asymmetric information, crowding-out, etc.
The character itself of debt will naturally push us to make specific hy-
potheses: since debts are intertemporal exchanges of assets between hetero-
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geneous agents, necessarily the model is to be dynamic and not based on
a single representative agent setting. The economy will be therefore repre-
sented by a network of interconnected agents, where nodes are agents and
links are trading relationships. The last main requirement, called for by the
dynamical nature of the model, is stock-flow consistency, that is the correct
specification of the temporal link between stocks and flows. The relevance of
stock-flow consistency as a prerequisite to build realistic and reliable macroe-
conomic models has been stressed not only by (now) minority schools such
as the Post-Keynesian one, according to which “flows come from somewhere
and go somewhere” (Godley, 1999; Godley and Lavoie, 2007), but also by
prominent orthodox economists (Tobin, 1969; 1982).
Our findings, qualitatively in accordance with the empirical evidence, are
straightforward: in the long-run debts determine a redistribution of income
and wealth from debtors to creditors. Thus, highly indebted agents will ex-
perience a lower capacity to spend. In addition, if debtors, as it is reasonable
to believe, have a higher marginal propensity to spend than creditors’, then
debts will also reduce aggregate spending, opening space to a wide range
of policy interventions. These results may not come as a surprise to some
Keynesian but we want to claim the added value of our modeling approach:
generality and parsimony of assumptions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
baseline model without debts, proves the existence of its equilibrium and
looks at the aggregate behavior. Section 3 embodies debts into the model
deriving the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The baseline model
Consider an economy operating in continuous time that is structured as a
network of n infinitely lived economic agents. The exact nature of the agents
does not need to be specified because in principle our approach can encompass
any real economic system. We point out that from a formal viewpoint our
model can be also conceived as a neural network or as a deterministic and
analytically solvable agent-based model.
Each agent i is characterized by the state variable Wi(t), standing for
its current stock of monetary wealth, and by the flow variables Ei(t) and
Ii(t) denoting respectively current expenditure and income. Expenditure is
treated as money flowing out of one agent and received as income by another
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agent, what is sufficient to imply the identity between aggregate income and
expenditure. Note that here expenditure is to be intended in a broad sense:
according to the kind of agents that are exchanging money it can account for
any form of spending, such as purchases of goods and services, productive
investments, payment of wages, etc. The only transactions that we want to
explicitly rule out are those related to debt contracts, which will be included
in the next section. As a consequence, the money supply is a constant, so
that we can assume
∑
Wi = M for each t.
As anticipated, our fundamental assumption is the imposition of consis-
tency between stocks and flows, which requires that flows must originate
from stocks and in stocks they must accumulate without leakages or undue
additions of money. Formally, two variables (x(t), y(t)) are generally said to
be stock-flow consistent (Patterson and Stephenson, 1988) if
dx(t)/dt = y(t). (1)
For example, if y denotes investments then x is the capital stock, or if y is
savings then x is the stock of wealth. In our setting the law of motion for
the wealth of the generic agent i will be:
W˙i(t) = Ii(t)− Ei(t). (2)
However, equation (1) is only a necessary condition for consistency as it
simply defines the law of motion for a stock variable, but does not impose
any particular restriction on the behavior of the flows. In other words, it
says where flows are going but not where they are coming from. Therefore,
in order to complete the implementation of stock-flow consistency we need to
determine how Ei(t) is financed, while Ii(t) will be automatically obtained
by the aggregate identity between income and expenditure. In what follows
we explain how.
From a logical point of view a time interval separates the flows of income
and expenditure. When an income is earned by an agent, it cannot be si-
multaneously used to finance expenditure: first it turns into a wealth stock
in accordance with equation (2), and then it can be spent. Consequently,
current income cannot be a direct source of current expenditure. At first
glance this statement would seem to clash with the established view accord-
ing to which income determines expenditure, and in fact it does if we do not
consider the proper time interval. If we observe an agent for a long period of
time, for example one year, then expenditure Ei(t) relative to this period can
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hardly be assumed as independent of the contemporaneous income Ii(t). In-
deed, almost all expenditure would be financed out of income. Nonetheless,
if we consider a period of one quarter, then it is reasonable to think expendi-
ture as largely but not totally financed out of the income earned during the
same quarter. Thus, considering shorter and shorter time intervals, we can
arrive to conceive a time unit that is small enough in order to be justified in
regarding individual expenditure as totally independent, within this period,
of individual income. Call this time lapse dt. Of course, real agents are in
general characterized by different dt’s. For example, a worker receives his
income on monthly basis, so in this case dt would correspond to one month,
while if we consider an agent making money on daily basis as a seller, then
dt would be one day. In order to cope with this heterogeneity it is sufficient
to us assuming that the chosen dt corresponds to the smallest among all the
agents. To convince the reader, we suggest an analogy with the physical
system of a reservoir full of water provided with an outlet for inflows and an
outlet for outflows: observed for small time intervals, the water entering in
the reservoir is not the water that at the same time is going out.
By now we have argued that for small time periods current income cannot
be regarded as the financing source of current expenditure. So, how might
agents finance their spending, considering moreover that they cannot resort
to debts? The only possible answer is that expenditure is financed by the
buffer of wealth available to each agent at the beginning of the period dt.
Basically, we are stating that in absence of debts a cash-in-advance constraint
must hold. As a consequence, even though from a behavioral point of view
expenditure may be any function fi(t), wealth must always provide an upper
bound such that
Ei(t) = min{fi(t),Wi(t)}. (3)
Hence, the logical chain backing our definition of stock-flow consistency can
be summarized as: W (t)→ E(t)→ I(t)→ W (t + dt).
Finally, to keep the model simple we assume that current expenditure is
proportional to wealth:
Ei(t) = ciWi(t), (4)
where ci is the marginal propensity to spend
1. Equation (4) satisfies the cash-
in-advance constraint (3) and is also an economically reasonable behavioral
rule. The condition ci ≤ 1 must hold true since we are not considering debts.
1However, this is a marginal propensity to spend out of wealth and not out of income.
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Hence, agents can spend at most what they posses. Notice that here ci is
treated as a parameter, but in principle nothing prevents it from varying
with time, provided it stays within the postulated boundaries.
Since the economy is populated by n agents we may imagine that expen-
diture Ei is shared among different partners of agent i, so with a slight abuse
of notation it can be generalized by a vector representation:
Ei = (Ei1, Ei2, ..., Ein) ≡ (ci1, ci2, ..., cin)Wi, (5)
where the generic element Eij represents a non-negative flow of money from
agent i to agent j such that the sum of the elements is equal to Ei and
the sum of the c′s is equal to ci. Obviously we have cii = 0. Grouping the
agents all together we define the n× n matrix E(t) of the expenditure flows
generated among all the agents during the period dt:
E =

E1
E2
...
En
 =

0 E12 E13 ... E1n
E21 0 E23 ... E2n
... ... ... ... ...
En1 En2 En3 ... 0
 (6)
Matrix E defines the network describing the interaction structure among the
agents and is based on the n× n matrix of coefficients C:
C =

0 c12 c13 ... c1n
c21 0 c23 ... c2n
... ... ... ... ...
cn1 cn2 cn3 ... 0

We can now obtain the income matrix I(t). Given E, consider for example
its element E21. E21 is an outflow from agent 2’s point of view, but at the
same time is an inflow for agent 1. Thus, while each row represents a profile
of expenditure by definition, each column represents a profile of income by
construction. From this we can deduce the income profile of agent i :
Ii(t) = (E1i, E2i, ..., Eni) ≡ (c1iW1, c2iW2, ..., cniWn). (7)
Consequently, the income matrix is straightforwardly defined as I = E ′.
Equations (5) and (7) allow to define the dynamics of the system as a
whole. Denoting the n× 1 vector of ones with 1, equation (2) becomes
W˙i = (Ii − Ei)1 =
∑
j
cjiWj −
∑
j
cijWi.
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Rearranging the above expression we get
W˙i = c1iW1 + c2iW2 + ...− (
∑
j
cij)Wi + ... + cniWn ≡ c˜iW
where W is the n×1 vector of wealth stocks and c˜i = (c1i, c2i, ...,−ci, ..., cni).
If we define the matrix C˜ as
C˜ =

c˜1
c˜2
...
c˜n
 =

−c1 c21 c31 ... cn1
c12 −c2 c32 ... cn2
... ... ... ... ...
c1n c2n c3n ... −cn

our model can be described by the set of n differential equations
W˙ = C˜W, (8)
with the additional constraint of a constant stock of money, that is
1′W = M.
It is sufficient for our purpose to concentrate ourselves on the steady-state
solution. Thus, we should find that vector W ∗ which satisfies the n conditions
W˙ = 0, that is C˜W = 0, and the money constraint 1′W = M . Apparently
this task seems impossible to accomplish because we have a system of n + 1
equations with n unknowns. However, our economy is a closed system and
aggregate expenditure is always equal to aggregate income. Consequently,
when n − 1 equations are satisfied also the last one is 2. Thus, the last
equation W˙n = 0 can be omitted, and our system reduces to
ΓW ≡

c˜1
...
c˜n−1
1′


W1
...
Wn−1
Wn
 =

0
...
0
M
 ≡ 0˜ (9)
Since now the n×n matrix Γ is non-singular, the required unique and stable3
solution can be immediately found:
W ∗ = Γ−1 0˜.
2Algebraically, matrix C˜ is singular, what can be easily verifiable by summing up its
rows.
3That it is also stable should be quite evident: wealth velocity is negatively affected
by its own level and positively affected by levels of other wealth stocks. Consequently, if
for instance W˙i is positive, Wi increases and the other wealths decrease because of the
constancy of total wealth, thus causing W˙i to decrease and Wi to slow down.
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In the simplest case with only two agents we have W1 + W2 = M and
W˙1 = c21W2 − c12W1. The two steady-state solutions are then
W ∗1 =
c21
c12 + c21
M, W ∗2 =
c12
c12 + c21
M.
The equilibrium value W ∗ does not depend on the initial conditions of W but
only on the set of marginal propensities to spend and on the total amount
of money. Besides, it shows the distributional implications of the model: the
wealth amount of one agent is increasing in the propensity to spend of the
other agent and decreasing in its own. The 2-agent case can be generalized
to any network of agents by the following statement:
Lemma 1. The equilibrium value W ∗i is decreasing in i’s spending coef-
ficients and increasing in those of its partners.
Even though we are able to provide a formal proof to Lemma 1 only
for special cases, as for instance when the number of agents is small or
the network is a regular ring lattice4, its general validity can be argued
by considering that every expenditure from i to j can increase i’s income
in the next period only less than proportionally since the spending coef-
ficients are all minus than one: given ∂Eij/∂cij = W
∗
i , it follows that
∂Eji/∂Wj = cjidWj = cjiW
∗
i dt since wealth Wj is increased by W
∗
i dt.
Before proceeding with the introduction of debts, which are the main
concern of the paper, we conclude this section by giving a look to the aggre-
gate behavior that can be inferred at equilibrium. The steady-state solution
W ∗ implies, in conjunction with equation (4), the existence for each agent
of a constant flow of expenditure E∗i = ciW
∗
i ≤ W ∗i . As equilibrium wealth
stocks are constant, the equality between income and expenditure for any
individual agent follows from equation (2): I∗i = E
∗
i . Hence, we can define
the steady-state aggregate income Y as
Y =
∑
i
I∗i =
∑
i
E∗i .
Since
∑
iE
∗
i =
∑
i ciW
∗
i ≤
∑
iW
∗
i = M , it follows that the equilibrium
aggregate income in a period dt is a fraction of the monetary stock, that is
Y ≤M . By using a mean-field approximation we can write it as
Y = cM, (10)
4But computer simulations confirmed the result for any kind of network we tried.
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where c is a weighted average of the ci’s, with weights depending on the
equilibrium wealth stocks W ∗. Equation (10) leads to conclude that the
steady-state income Y can increase only if c→ 1 and/or if the money stock
increases. So, in both cases Y is always limited by M . However, this conclu-
sion must be interpreted carefully: it does not mean that an increase in the
monetary stock M automatically delivers a corresponding increase in income
Y , because the true behavioral parameter here is c. Money stock M only
determines the upper bound of nominal income.
3 Debt dynamics
In this section we relax the assumption of absence of debts. We limit to con-
sider the case of additional expenditure financed by selling bonds or other
securities which do not cause the money stock to increase, such as mort-
gages, commercial paper or repos, leaving the introduction of bank loans for
future research. The results that follow naturally apply to a setting with a
Government that finances public expenditure by selling bonds directly to the
market, because in this case the stock of money would not grow.
In order to keep things simple, we assume that borrowers and lenders are
two disjunct sets of agents such that who borrows does not lend and vice
versa. Let D(t) be the n × n matrix containing the stocks of debt at time
t, where the generic entry Dij stands for the outstanding debt that agent i
owes to agent j. During the time interval dt debtors have to pay interests
and principal to creditors, so we can define
F = (i + a)D (11)
as the matrix of the financial flows Fij from agent i to agent j, where we
make the simplifications of a uniform interest rate i and of a uniform debt
repayment coefficient a. The latter coefficient can be interpreted as the
reciprocal of the debt contract length: the bigger a, the faster the debt
reimbursement. Finally, we define L as the matrix of current credit flows,
whose generic entry Lij stands for the new credits supplied by agent i to
agent j. In order to fulfill our stock-flow consistency requirements, we make
the additional assumption that for every creditor i the condition must hold:∑
j
Lij ≤ Wi − Ei ≡ (1− ci)Wi. (12)
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We recall that by construction Fij and Lij are outflows for i and inflows for
j. Consequently, the law of motion for the wealth stocks is5:
W˙ (t) = I(t)− E(t) +
∑
(F ′ + L′ − F − L). (13)
The system is completed by the law of motion for debt stocks, which in
matrix form looks as
D˙ = L′ − aD. (14)
It remains to define the loan matrix L. In order to satisfy condition (12)
we impose that the total flow of credit be proportional to wealth. So, if i is
a lender, we have
Li = (Li1, Li2, ..., Lin) ≡ (ri1, ri2, ..., rin)Wi, (15)
such that
∑
j rij ≤ (1− ci). The last condition assures that current lending
is not greater than the wealth left after expenditure.
Equations (13) and (14) represent a system of coupled differential equa-
tions, whose steady state is given by the pair (W ∗∗, D∗). Notice, however,
that the system is block-recursive since the equations W˙ do not directly af-
fect the dynamic of the debts. Hence, we can first resolve the second block of
equations (14), and then substitute the steady state values in the first block
(13). Doing so, the sub-system (13) reduces to
W˙ (t) = I(t)− E(t) + i
a
∑
(L− L′), (16)
where we used the steady-state solution D∗ = L′/a together with equation
(11). The flows of interest payments are given by iL′/a and enter in equations
(16) with negative sign for debtors, while interest gains iL/a enter with
positive sign for creditors. Debt repayments aD∗ and new loans L offset
each other and in the long run do not affect wealth distribution.
In order to find the steady-state solutions W ∗∗ we have to carry out
some trivial matrix manipulation as in section 2. Rearranging the expression∑
(L− L′), equations (16) become
W˙ (t) = C˜W +
i
a
HW, (17)
5By
∑
X we mean the n× 1 column vector of the sum of the columns of matrix X.
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where C˜ is the same as in section 2. Rows of matrix H are different for
lenders and borrowers because we are assuming the two groups of agents to
be separate. Supposing that agent l is a lender, then its row in H is
Hl = (0, ...,
∑
j
rlj, ..., 0),
where the non-null entry is in position l. The row corresponding to a borrower
b is
Hb = (−r1b,−r2b, ..., 0, ...,−rnb)
where the null entry is in position b. The system is obviously provided with
a unique steady-state solution W ∗∗ since it is affine to system (8) and its
coefficients are chosen in order to satisfy the conservation of money6. More
interesting is to understand how it differs from the solution W ∗ without
debts.
Let’s first consider a lender l. The law of motion for its wealth computed
in W ∗ is
W˙l = c1lW
∗
1 + c2lW
∗
2 + ...− clW ∗l + ... + cnlW ∗n +
i
a
∑
j
rljW
∗
l .
Since W ∗ is the steady-state solution for system (8), the summation c1lW ∗1 +
c2lW
∗
2 + ... − clW ∗l + ... + cnlW ∗n is equal to zero. As a consequence, the
time derivative of Wl is positive, implying that at W
∗ the wealth of a lender
is increasing. The presence of the last positive term goes to diminish the
spending coefficient of the lender towards the other agents. Thus, by Lemma
1 the value of Wl in W
∗∗ must be higher than in W ∗. The same arguments
lead to conclude that the opposite is true for a borrower b, whose steady-state
wealth will be lower than in W ∗ because the derivative
W˙b = c1bW
∗
1 + c2bW
∗
2 + ...− cbW ∗b + ... + cnbW ∗n −
i
a
∑
j
rj bW
∗
j
is negative. The presence of the last negative term goes to diminish the
spending coefficients of other agents towards the borrower and, again by
Lemma 1, we have W ∗∗b < W
∗
b .
In principle nothing can be inferred about those who are neither lender
nor borrower, because their income depends on the wealth of their partners:
6We also need that the ratio i/a is not too high.
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if their income relies more on borrowers (lenders), then their wealth should
decrease (increase).
These conclusions are simple but meaningful: in the short-run borrowers
(lenders) increase (decrease) their spending by using external finance (lend-
ing their savings), but in the long-run their wealth and, consequently, their
expenditure will be lower (higher). Thus, the ultimate effect of debts fi-
nanced without affecting the monetary stock is not of increasing expenditure
but of causing a redistribution of wealth in favor of lenders. As one could
expect, the entity of this redistribution is increasing in the interest rate i
and decreasing in the debt contract duration a. Moreover, if borrowers are
likely to have a larger marginal propensity to spend than lenders’, then in the
long run an economy with debts will be characterized by a smaller average
marginal propensity to spend. Consequently, debts not only do not increase
nominal income and expenditure, but more likely they will reduce them.
Our result bears non trivial policy implications. In fact, if the Govern-
ment is one of the borrowing agents, then part of the debts D∗ are public
debt. Therefore, according to above considerations an economy characterized
by higher public debt in the long run will dispose in general of a lower income
and in particular of less public expenditure. This outcome is consistent at
least qualitatively with the ongoing European debt crisis and with debt crises
historically experienced by Latin American and African Countries.
4 Conclusive remarks
The scope of this paper was to investigate the long-run consequences of debt
on the economy. Our approach was guided by two major concerns. The
first one was, differently from most of macroeconomics, to keep the model
as simple as possible in order to develop a pure theory of debt where its ef-
fects could be analyzed in isolation without resorting to auxiliary hypotheses
such as asymmetric information, crowding-out, expectations, etc. The other
concern was to introduce a form of dynamic consistency between stocks and
flows, able to assure that “flows come from somewhere and go somewhere”.
We first started with the outline of a dynamic model without debt and
with constant money supply depicted as a system of differential equations,
which predicted that the steady-state aggregate income flow is always limited
from the above by the amount of money available to the economy.
Finally, we introduced the possibility for agents of going into debts, while
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retaining the hypotheses of a constant amount of money. The model so aug-
mented predicted that in the long-run debts determine a redistribution of
wealth and income from debtors to creditors. As final effect it may also be
that debts lower the aggregate marginal propensity to spend and nominal in-
come. We believe that this conclusion is highly consistent with the empirical
literature on the topic and with debt crises experienced in the past decades
by developing Countries and currently by Europe.
The case with a variable money supply is left for future research.
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